

# **Fast and Scalable Method for Resolving Anomalies in Firewall Policies**

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Verizon


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# Introduction

- Firewalls
- Types of Anomalies
- Related Work
- Data Structure and Algorithm
- Experimental Results
- Conclusion

# Firewalls

- Firewall
  - System acting as an interface of a network to one or more external networks.
  - Implements the security policy of the network
    - By deciding which packets to let through
      - Based on rules defined by the network administrator.




# Example

Id	Protocol	Source		Destination		Action	Probability
		IP address	Port	IP address	Port		
r <sub>1</sub>	TCP	71.123.10.*	any	10.0.0.1	21	permit	0.3
r <sub>2</sub>	TCP	*.*.*.*	any	10.0.0.1	21-23	deny	0.25
r <sub>3</sub>	TCP	71.*.*.*	any	10.0.0.1	21	permit	0.15
r <sub>4</sub>	TCP	71.123.*.*	any	10.0.0.1	21	deny	0.1
r <sub>5</sub>	TCP	*.*.*.*	any	10.0.0.1	23-25	permit	0.1

# Protection Methods

- Firewalls – Firewall policy rules should be designed carefully!
- Challenges
  - Rules are created by multiple people
  - Rules are created over extended period of time
  - Number of rules in a firewall policy can be 5K+!
  - Rules are dynamic!

# Relationships Between Rules - Disjoint Rules




- Two rules  $r$  and  $s$  are disjoint if they have at least one criterion for which they have completely disjoint values

## ■ Example:

- $\langle \text{IN, TCP, 64.233.179.104, 80, } \mathbf{192.168.20.*}, \text{ ANY, ACCEPT} \rangle$
- $\langle \text{IN, TCP, 64.233.179.104, 80, } \mathbf{172.16.20.*}, \text{ ANY, REJECT} \rangle$

# Relationships Between Rules - Exactly Matching




- Two rules  $r$  and  $s$  are exactly matched if each criterion of the rules match exactly.

## ■ Example:

- $\langle \text{IN, TCP, 64.233.179.104, 80, 192.168.20.*}, \text{ANY, ACCEPT} \rangle$
- $\langle \text{IN, TCP, 64.233.179.104, 80, 192.168.20.*}, \text{ANY, ACCEPT} \rangle$

# Relationships Between Rules - Inclusively Matching (Shadowing)




- Two rules  $r$  is a subset, or inclusively matched of another rule  $s$  if there exists at least one criterion for which  $r$ 's value is a subset of  $s$ 's value and for the rest of the attributes  $r$ 's value is equal to  $s$ 's values.

## ■ Example:

- $\langle \text{IN, TCP, 64.233.179.104, } \mathbf{80, 192.168.20.3}, \text{ ANY, ACCEPT} \rangle$
- $\langle \text{IN, TCP, 64.233.179.104, } \mathbf{ANY, 192.168.20.*}, \text{ ANY, ACCEPT} \rangle$



# Relationships Between Rules - Correlated



- Two rules  $r$  and  $s$  are correlated if  $r$  and  $s$  are not disjoint, but neither is the subset of the other.

## ■ Example:

- $\langle \text{IN, TCP, 64.233.179.104, ANY, 192.168.20.3, ANY, ACCEPT} \rangle$
- $\langle \text{IN, TCP, 64.233.179.104, 80, 192.168.20.*, ANY, REJECT} \rangle$

# Existing Work

- E. W. Fulp –  $O(n^3)$  algorithm to order rules in a given policy; it doesn't discover correlated ones.
- E. Al-Saher *et al.* – Method for selecting rules based on their probability.
- A. Liu – Method to discover and remove redundant rules (Exact matching).

# Our Approach

- We aim at removing few troublesome rules from given policy to resolve anomalies.
- Design a data structure to represent dependencies among rules.
- Remove troublesome rules.
- Return a subset of consistent rules and correlated rules (for editing).

# Our Approach

- Design a data structure to represent dependencies among rules.
- Graph D is directed, and U is undirected.
  - Each node in U represents a rule
  - Two nodes are connected in U if there is *shadowing* or *correlation* relationship between these two rules.
- Graph D describes dependency among rules.


# Our Approach

- Select a rule that doesn't depend on any other rule (terminal node) from D.
- Remove corresponding links from U and links/nodes from D.
- If graph U is disconnected and new component formed, continue, else there is correlation
- If there is correlation, choose the rule with highest probability.

# Example

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# Example – Our Approach



# Complexity

- $O(n^2)$  to construct graphs  $D$  and  $U$
- $O(2 \log n)$  to discover dependencies
- Algorithm complexity  $O(n^2 \log n)$



# Experimental Results

- Two sets of test experiments executed:
  - Real-life tests: five policies of size 107, 361, 647, 881, and 1385 over a month period on Verizon firewall using the original (non-improved) approach.
  - Tests done over the same period using improved approach.
- Five test sets have been executed on synthetic policies of sizes 10K – 30K.

# Experimental Results – Real-Life Policies

Test	No. of Rules	Avg. Base Comp.	Avg. Correlation	Avg. Dependency	Imp. Ratio
1	107	43.1	2.7	8.5	63.3%
2	361	87.2	1.4	2.2	47.2%
3	647	381.1	3.1	7.9	62.7%
4	881	341.6	3.3	6.4	71.2%
5	1385	715.3	3.8	6.7	74.8%

# Experimental Results – Synthetic Policies

Test	No. of Rules	Avg. Base Comp.	Avg. Correlation	Avg. Dependency	Imp. Ratio
1	10K	4224	121.3	13.5	68.6 %
2	12.5K	5584	389.6	11.6	40.5 %
3	15K	8054	274.7	12.0	76.4 %
4	25.5K	14263	649.2	15.2	79.3 %
5	30K	17714	712.4	20.7	87.6 %

# Current & Future Work

- Find exact minimum number of rules to eliminate all anomalies from policy.
- Modify algorithm to handle dynamic-policies.
- Improve the algorithm performance.

**Thank You All!**

**Questions?**