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# In-Network Placement of Security VNFs in Multi-Tenant Data Centers

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# Agenda

- ▶ Introduction
- ▶ Background
- ▶ Literature Review
- ▶ Proposed System
- ▶ Evaluation

# Introduction

- ▶ Problem
  - ▶ The placement of Security Functions in Multi-tenant Data Centers.
- ▶ Objective and Research questions
  - ▶ **Identify** unique characteristics of security functions as VNF.
  - ▶ Design of a placement framework that
    - ▶ Considers the unique **characteristics** of security functions
    - ▶ Provides **customised services**
    - ▶ in **multi-tenant environments**

# Background

## Hardware-based Middleboxes

Fixed allocation

Centralized & Monolithic  
systems

Limited extent of functionality

Vendor lock-in

Expensive

## Software-based Middleboxes

Rapid and Flexible deployment

Scalable resources

Allow extension of functionality

No Vendor lock-in

Inexpensive compared to HW


## Example of Security Services

### ► Amazon's AWS Multitenant virtualized infrastructures

- (2015) Firewall web application(WAF) , Dec 2016 AWS Shield (DDoS protection services) , Nov 2017 GuardDuty (Intelligent threat detection)
- Alert Logic , Armor, Cisco and Barracuda

# Management of Software middleboxes

- ▶ NFV
  - ▶ Software-based NFs
  - ▶ Efficient resource provisioning
  - ▶ Flexibility of Placement
- ▶ SDN
  - ▶ Centralised control
  - ▶ Programmability
  - ▶ Global view of the network



# Literature Review

- ▶ Management of Softwarized middleboxes is complex and expensive
- ▶ Reviewing VNF placement and security function processing
- ▶ Issues and limitations for security function in Multitenant infrastructure
  - ▶ Traffic constraints (**Stateless, Stateful**)
  - ▶ Duplication of security functions (instances)
  - ▶ Shared security functions among tenants

# Security Functions Equivalence Classes

## ▶ Stateless modules

- ▶ process traffic at the individual flow or packet level. Therefore, it can operate independently at different links in case of per-flow routing.
- ▶ VNF of this class can be duplicated across network locations where tenant's traffic is being split, as long as the routing is per-flow (**independent duplication**)

## ▶ Stateful modules

- ▶ process traffic to detect anomalies based on a coarser traffic granularity such as flow aggregation to build a behaviour model.
- ▶ It will require all the flows of the monitored traffic to be rerouted to one instance of the network function of this type.
- ▶ Or monitoring nodes could be deployed wherever traffic is distributed. they will extract the needed features from the traffic and share this information with the main node that takes the detection decision. (**Dependent duplication**)

## Stateless

Firewalls

Signature-based (IDS)

Deep Packet Inspection(DPI)

Examples: ZoneAlarm, Snort, Suricata

Dependent duplication

Allocation

## Stateful

Anomaly based IDS,IPS

Examples: Change point Detection, Entropy and Classifiers


Single instance or depended duplication

# Resource-Aware Security Placement Framework

- ▶ On-path deployment
  - ▶ Collocated with the network switches
- ▶ Target efficient management of resources, minimum overhead and consider ECMP
  - ▶ independent duplication (stateless class)
  - ▶ Dependent duplication (stateful class)

## Constraints

- ▶ Traffic
- ▶ Resources
- ▶ Security





# Mathematical Models

$$\max. \left[ \sum_{\forall s \in S} s.c - \sum_{\forall r \in Q} \sum_{\forall p \in P} \sum_{\forall s \in S} x_{r,p} \cdot u_{p,r,s} \right]$$

Max Residual Resources **RS**

$$\min. \left[ \sum_{\forall r \in Q} \sum_{\forall p \in P} \sum_{\forall l \in L} x_{r,p} \cdot v_{p,r,l} \cdot l.w \right]$$

Min Communication Overhead **CO**

Objectives

$$\text{s.t. } \sum_{\forall r \in Q} \sum_{\forall p \in P} x_{r,p} \cdot u_{p,r,s} \leq s.c \quad \forall s \in S$$

Switches Capacity

$$\sum_{\forall r \in Q} \sum_{\forall p \in P} x_{r,p} \cdot v_{p,r,l} \leq l.b \quad \forall l \in L$$

Links Capacity

$$x_{r,p} = 0, \quad \forall r \in Q, \forall p \in P \quad \text{if } w_{p,r} = 0$$

Location Validity

$$\sum_{\forall p \in P} x_{r,p} = 1, \quad \forall r \in Q$$

One allocation

Constraints

# Solutions

## ▶ Constraint Programming

- ▶ Model solved using Cplex optimiser
- ▶ CP RS+CO adding the two objective with equal weight
- ▶ CP\_two\_Pass optimising the stateful requests CO then the stateless for RS

## ▶ Heuristic

- ▶ RANDOM
- ▶ First Fit Decreasing (FFD)
- ▶ Best Fit Decreasing (BFD)

## ▶ Legacy one-instance strategy

- ▶ The one instance simulates the legacy allocation of hardware middleboxes where in case of traffic distributed over multiple links, all traffic must be steered to one instance of the module.

# BFD

- ▶ In FFD the requests are ordered in decreasing order based on resource consumption and are allocated to first fit (module types with high resource consumption allocated first).
- ▶ In BFD, the requests are ordered the same way as in FFD, and then they are allocated to the best-fit location where the total cost is minimised.

**Input:** Set of requests  $Q$ , set of locations  $L$


**Output:** Set of requests allocated to locations  $A$

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
```
1:  $A \leftarrow \emptyset$  // initialisation
2:  $Q^* \leftarrow \text{sort}(Q)$  // sort request w.r.t. resources
3: for all  $r \in Q^*$  do
4:   for all  $l \in L$  do
5:     if ( $\text{capacity}(A, r, l) = \text{TRUE}$ )  $\wedge$  ( $\text{validation}(r, l) = \text{TRUE}$ ) then
6:        $l^* = \arg \min_{l' \in L} \text{total\_cost}(r, l')$ 
7:     end if
8:     if ( $l^* \neq 0$ ) then
9:        $A \leftarrow A \cup \{(r, l^*)\}$  // allocate request  $r$  to location  $l^*$ 
10:    end if
11:  end for
12: end for
13: return Set of allocated requests  $A$ 
```

# Evaluation

## The effect of the modules' sizes workload




(a) Residual Resources




(b) Communication Overhead

- ▶ BFD offers more RS that can reach 50% of other algorithms.
- ▶ BFD offers reduced communication overhead up to 80%.
- ▶ Single-instance BFD has more spare resources than other algorithms but has more communication overhead.
- ▶ CP Two-pass exhibits the least communication overhead compared to other algorithms where is priorities CO over RS functions.
- ▶ CP RS+CO exhibits more RS than CP two-pass because it balances between the two objectives while CP two-pass gives priority to CO over RS, however, CP RS+CO only show 10% more RS than BFD.

# The effect of traffic demand of tenant as workload



(a) Residual Resources



(b) Communication Overhead

- ▶ RS slightly decreases as the traffic part of functions' required resources is depending on traffic rate and results in a reduction in spare resources.
- ▶ BFD still shows less reduction than FFD and FF that reach up to more than 20% in spare resources.
- ▶ CP RS+CO, CP Two-pass and BFD still show a significantly higher RS compared to FF and FFD.
- ▶ CO shows steady results for the BFD algorithm due to being normalised to the total consumed bandwidth which also increases with the workload.
- ▶ CP two-pass has the least communication overhead compared to other types including the CP RS+CO due to prioritising CO over RS.

# Conclusion

- ▶ Security functions impose unique constraints to the placement problem such as limited duplication that can cause increase in resource consumption.
- ▶ Sharing security functions in multitenant environments increases management complexity.
- ▶ Security placement framework exploits on-path allocation to minimise resource overhead while satisfying the security placement imposed constraints.
- ▶ The BFD algorithm has shown higher performance compared to other heuristic algorithms utilising computing and communication resources.
- ▶ BFD showed less RS than legacy single-instance strategy but less Communication overhead.
- ▶ BFD showed near optimal CP performance.