<XML><RECORDS><RECORD><REFERENCE_TYPE>31</REFERENCE_TYPE><REFNUM>6537</REFNUM><AUTHORS><AUTHOR>Nagarajan,R.</AUTHOR><AUTHOR>Gay,S.J.</AUTHOR></AUTHORS><YEAR>2002</YEAR><TITLE>Formal Verification of Quantum Protocols</TITLE><PLACE_PUBLISHED><A href="http://www.arxiv.org/abs/quant- ph/0203086">Quantum Physics Archive</A></PLACE_PUBLISHED><PUBLISHER>Quantum Physics Archive</PUBLISHER><LABEL>Nagarajan:2002:6537</LABEL><KEYWORDS><KEYWORD>quantum key distribution</KEYWORD></KEYWORDS<ABSTRACT>We propose to analyse quantum protocols by applying formal verification techniques developed in classical computing for the analysis of communicating concurrent systems. One area of successful application of these techniques is that of classical security protocols, exemplified by Lowe's discovery and fix of a flaw in the well-known Needham-Schroeder authentication protocol. Secure quantum cryptographic protocols are also notoriously difficult to design. Quantum cryptography is therefore an interesting target for formal verification, and provides our first example; we expect the approach to be transferable to more general quantum information processing scenarios. The example we use is the quantum key distribution protocol proposed by Bennett and Brassard, commonly referred to as BB84. We present a model of the protocol in the process calculus CCS and the results of some initial analyses using the Concurrency Workbench of the New Century (CWB-NC).</ABSTRACT><URL>http://www.arxiv.org/abs/quant-ph/0203086</URL></RECORD></RECORDS></XML>