Computing at Glasgow University
Paper ID: 8999
DCS Tech Report Number: TR-2008-291

Student Admissions in Hungary as Gale and Shapley Envisaged

Publication Type: Tech Report (internal)
Appeared in: DCS Technical Report Series
Page Numbers : 1-7
Publisher: Dept of Computing Science, University of Glasgow
Year: 2008

Student admissions, for both secondary and higher education in Hungary, are organised by centralised matching schemes. The program for secondary schools is based on the original model and algorithm of Gale and Shapley, which makes this application especially interesting. The program for higher education is more complex; the model has several special features, but the core of the algorithm is the same. Besides presenting these applications, we study one important aspect of the higher education scheme, the solution concept of score-limit. Here, we formulate appropriate stability criteria that take score-limit into account and then we prove that the existing algorithms that are used/have been used produce matchings that are stable according to these criteria. Therefore, we show that the results of Gale and Shapley apply for the generalised model as well, namely, the applicant/college-oriented algorithms produce stable score-limits, moreover these solutions are the best/worst possible stable score-limits for the applicants.

Keywords: stable matching problem, college admissions, mechanism design

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