

# Security Types for Dynamic Web Data

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# Distributed systems - decentralised peer-to-peer networks

- secure management of distributed data (XML)
  - different processes have different access rights
  - dynamic changes of access rights
  - different access policies in different locations
  - exchange between data and processes preserving access control
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- One solution - typed models
    - control of access
    - control of movements rights

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## Related work

- $Xd\pi$  calculus - Gardner, Maffeis
  - localised mobile processes
  - distributed, dynamic, semi-structured web data



Philippa Gardner and Sergio Maffeis.

Modelling dynamic web data.

*Theoretical Computer Science*, 342(1):104–131, 2005.

- Variety of type systems for  $d\pi$  and related calculi
  - controlling the use of accesses and mobility of processes

# Security levels

- Security types for  $Xd\pi$   
Dezani, Ghilezan, Pantović, Varacca, 2008
  - partially ordered set (with bottom) as security levels
  - communication, movement and data usage control



Mariangiola Dezani-Ciancaglini, Silvia Ghilezan, and Jovanka Pantovic.  
Security types for dynamic web data.  
*TGC*, volume 4661 of *Lecture Notes in Computer Science*, pages 263–280.  
Springer, 2006.



Mariangiola Dezani-Ciancaglini, Silvia Ghilezan, Jovanka Pantovic, and  
Daniele Varacca.  
Security types for dynamic web data.  
*Theor. Comput. Sci.*, 402(2-3):156–171, 2008.

# Roles

- Security types for  $\mathbb{R}Xd\pi$ -calculus  
Dezani, Ghilezan, Jakšić, Pantović, 2011
  - partially ordered set of roles, RBAC
  - dynamic change of access rights
  - communication, movement and data usage control



Mariangiola Dezani-Ciancaglini, Silvia Ghilezan, Svetlana Jakšić, and Jovanka Pantović.

Types for Role-Based Access Control of Dynamic Web Data.

In *WFLP'10*, volume 6559 of *LNCS*, pages 1–29. Springer, 2011.




Silvia Ghilezan, Svetlana Jakšić, Jovanka Pantović, and Mariangiola Dezani-Ciancaglini.

Types and Roles for Web Security.

*Transactions on Advanced Research*, 8(2):16–21, 2012.

## Locations and networks




- Each **location** consists of data in a form of a tree and a process
- A well-formed **network** is a parallel composition (  $|$  ) of *locations* with different names.

$$\mathbf{N} ::= \mathbf{0} \mid \mathbf{N} \mid \mathbf{N} \mid l[T \parallel R] \mid (\nu c^{T\nu})\mathbf{N}$$

# Data


```
< mbox >  
  < forum >  
    p@l1  
  < /forum >  
  < download >  
    □ P2  
  < /download >  
< /mbox >
```





# Data

```
< mbox role = guest >  
  < forum role = guest >  
    p@λ  
  < /forum >  
  < download role = member >  
    □R  
  < /download >  
< /mbox >
```



# Processes

## $\pi$ -calculus

$P$	::=	$0$	the nil process
		$P \mid P$	composition of processes
		$\bar{c}^T v \langle v \rangle$	output value $v$ on a channel $c$
		$c^T v(x).P$	input parameterized by a variable $x$
		$!c^T v(x).P$	replication of an input process

## $d\pi$ -calculus

$P$	::=	$\text{go } \lambda.R$	migrate to location $\lambda$ , continue as $R$
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## $Xd\pi$ -calculus

$P$	::=	$\text{run}_p$	run command
		$\text{read}_p(\chi).P$	read command
		$\text{change}_p(\chi, V).P$	change command

# Processes

## ⓂX $d\pi$ -calculus

$P ::=$	$\text{enable}(r)_\rho.P$	gives permission to the role $r$ to access data on the path $\rho$
	$  \text{disable}(r)_\rho.P$	removes the role $r$ from roles that are allowed to access data on the path $\rho$
$R ::=$	$P \uparrow \rho$	single process with roles $\rho$
	$  R R$	parallel composition of processes with roles
	$  (\nu c^{T\nu})R$	restriction of channel name $c$

# Type system

## Main goals

- to control communication of values
- to control migration and activation of processes
- to control access to data and their modification
- to control change of access rights

## Location Policy

$$\mathcal{P} = (\sigma, \mathcal{E}, \mathcal{D})$$

- $\sigma$ : set of minimal roles which can access data
- $\mathcal{E}$ : policy for role enabling
- $\mathcal{D}$ : policy for role disabling

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# Syntax of types

$Ch(Tv)$	type of channels communicating values of type $Tv$
$Loc(\mathcal{P})$	type of locations with the policy $\mathcal{P}$
$Script(\mathcal{P})$	type of scripts which can be activated at locations with the policy $\mathcal{P}$
$Path(\alpha)$	type of paths having the last edge with the set of roles $\alpha$
$Pointer(\alpha)$	type of pointers whose path is typed by $Path(\alpha)$
$Tree(\mathcal{P}, \tau, \zeta)$	type of trees, which can stay at locations with the policy $\mathcal{P}$ , with initial branches asking $\tau$ and which can be completely accessed by processes with at least one role of $\zeta$
$Proc(\mathcal{P}, \rho)$	type of pure processes, which can stay at locations with the policy $\mathcal{P}$ and which can be assigned roles $\rho$
$ProcRole(\mathcal{P})$	type of processes with roles which can stay at locations with the policy $\mathcal{P}$

## Typing rules

$$\Gamma \vdash p : \text{Path}(\alpha) \quad \Gamma \vdash P : \text{Proc}(\mathcal{P}, \rho) \quad \alpha \leq \rho$$
$$\Gamma \cup \Gamma_\chi \vdash \begin{cases} V : \text{Script}(\mathcal{P}) \text{ or} \\ V : \text{Pointer}(\beta) \text{ or} \\ V : \text{Tree}(\mathcal{P}, \tau', \zeta') \quad \alpha \leq \tau' \\ \text{if } \chi = x^{(\mathcal{P}, \tau, \zeta)} \text{ then } \zeta \leq \rho \end{cases} \quad (\text{Change})$$

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$$\Gamma \vdash \text{change}_\rho(\chi, V).P : \text{Proc}(\mathcal{P}, \rho)$$
$$\frac{\vdash I : \text{Loc}(\mathcal{P}) \quad \vdash T : \text{Tree}(\mathcal{P}, \tau, \zeta) \quad \vdash R : \text{ProcRole}(\mathcal{P})}{\vdash I \llbracket T \parallel R \rrbracket : \text{Net}} \quad (\text{NetLoc})$$

# Safety properties

- (Subject reduction) If  $\vdash \mathbf{N} : \mathit{Net}$  and  $\mathbf{N} \rightarrow \mathbf{N}'$ , then  $\vdash \mathbf{N}' : \mathit{Net}$ .
- Properties of location policies and communication:
  - P0** All trees and processes in a location agree with the location policy;
  - P1** A process with roles can communicate only values with characteristic roles accessible to the process.
- Properties of migration between locations:
  - P2** A process with roles can migrate to another location only if it is well typed for that location.
- Properties of access of processes to local data trees:
  - P3** A process with roles looks for a path in the local tree only if the path is accessible to the process.



# Safety properties

- Properties of manipulation of local data trees by processes:
  - P4** A script is activated in a location only if the corresponding process with roles can stay in that location;
  - P5** A process with roles generated by a read command in a location can stay in that location;
  - P6** A process with roles can erase a subtree of data only if it can access all data;
  - P7** A tree built by a change command in a location can stay in that location;
  - P8** A process with roles can add a role to an edge in the local tree only if this is allowed by the location policy;
  - P9** A tree built by an enable command in a location can stay in that location;
  - P10** A process with roles can erase a role from an edge in the local tree only if this is allowed by the location policy;
  - P11** A tree built by a disable command in a location can stay in that location.

## Future work

- extension of type system
- security and privacy properties of systems with data in other formats