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Chris Johnson's

Military Risk Assessment: From Conventional Warfare to Counter Insurgency Operations

University of Glasgow Press, Glasgow, Scotland, August 2012. ISBN 978-0-85261-933-9.

You can download a copy for personal use but please read the copyright notices .

• Chapter 1: An Introduction to Military Risk Management
  • 1.1 Risk Management Processes in MIL STD 882D
  • 1.2 Risk Management Techniques
    • 1.2.1 HAZOPS
    • 1.2.2 FMECA
    • 1.2.3 ALARP, ALARA and MEM
  • 1.3 Dimensions of Risk
    • 1.3.1 Risk and Uncertainty
    • 1.3.2 Subjective and Objective Risks
    • 1.3.3 Units of Measurement
  • 1.4 The Psychology of Risk
    • 1.4.1 Risk Aversion and Regret
    • 1.4.2 Fear
    • 1.4.3 Risk Equity
  • 1.5 Risk and Decision Making
    • 1.5.1 Framing
    • 1.5.2 Recognition Primed Decision Making
    • 1.5.3 Situation Awareness and Confirmation Bias
    • 1.5.4 Target Levels of Risk
  • 1.6 Sociology of Risk
    • 1.6.1 Risky Shift, Group Caution and Risk Polarization
    • 1.6.2 Risk Transfer
    • 1.6.3 Decision Transfer
    • 1.6.4 Risk Society and the Precautionary Principle
  • 1.7 Overview of the Remaining Chapters
  • 1.8 References for Chapter One

  
  

• Chapter 2: The Challenge of Military Risk Assessment
  • 2.1 Threat Inflation
  • 2.2 Bias Towards Short Term Threats
  • 2.3 Development-Risk and Innovation
  • 2.4 Risk Assessments Fixated with Failure
  • 2.5 Risk Assessments Encourage Decision Transfer
  • 2.6 Risk Framing and the Hazards of Mitigation
  • 2.7 Training Risks Decrease Operational Risks?
  • 2.8 Military Training Encourages Risky Shift
  • 2.9 Availability Heuristic Undermines Risk Assessments
  • 2.10 Unthinking Enthusiasm Weakens Risk Assessment
  • 2.11 Tactical Vulnerabilities from Military Risk Assessments
  • 2.12 References for Chapter Two

  
  

• Chapter 3: Military Incident and Accident Reporting
  • 3.1 The Benefits of Incident Reporting for Military Risk Assessment
    • 3.1.1 Incident Reporting, Risk Assessment and Safety Management
    • 3.1.2 Feedback of Lessons Learned to Military Risk Assessment
    • 3.1.3 Insights into Patterns of On-Duty and Off-Duty Hazards
    • 3.1.4 Feedback on Risk and Decision Making
    • 3.1.5 Insights into Safety Culture and Military Justice
  • 3.2 The Limitations of Incident Reporting for Military Risk Assessment
    • 3.2.1 On the Need to Support Proactive Decision Making
    • 3.2.2 What Should be Reported?
    • 3.2.3 Dealing with the Unexpected
    • 3.2.4 The Politics of Acceptable Risk
    • 3.2.5 Incident Reports and the Politics of Military Risk Assessment
    • 3.2.6 Problems of Scale
  • 3.3 Normal Accidents in Military Operations
  • 3.4 References for Chapter Three

  
  

• Chapter 4: Degraded Modes and the Military Culture of Coping
  • 4.1 The Accident On-board HMS Tireless
  • 4.2 Procurement, Degraded Modes and Risk Assessment
  • 4.3 Tolerance for Risk in Degraded Modes of Operation
  • 4.4 Logistics and Management of Degraded Modes of Operation
  • 4.5 Trust and the Mitigation of Risk
  • 4.6 Degraded Modes and Dimensions of Coping
    • 4.6.1 The Risks of Emergency Management
    • 4.6.2 Training and an Expectation of Risk
    • 4.6.3 Communications Failures
  • 4.7 Degraded Modes and the Compound Risks of Military Operations
  • 4.8 References for Chapter Four

  
  

• Chapter 5: Systemic Risks of Fatigue in Military Operations
  • 5.1 Introduction to Human Error
    • 5.1.1 Resilience and the Myth of Error Free Performance
    • 5.1.2 Violations, Slips, Lapses and Mistakes
    • 5.1.3 Task Based Approaches to Error
    • 5.1.4 Human Reliability Analysis
    • 5.1.5 Performance Shaping Factors
  • 5.2 Fatigue and the Risk of Error
    • 5.2.1 Problems of Self-Diagnosis
    • 5.2.2 Circadian Rhythms
    • 5.2.3 Other Performance Shaping Factors
  • 5.3 Consequences of Fatigue
    • 5.3.1 Inability to Self-Monitor Fatigue
    • 5.3.2 Microsleeps and Encysting
    • 5.3.3 False Responding
    • 5.3.4 Poor Decision Making
  • 5.4 Countermeasures for Fatigue and Sleep Loss
    • 5.4.1 Restorative Sleep
    • 5.4.2 Motivation and Task Rotation
    • 5.4.3 Training and Monitoring
    • 5.4.4 Technological Countermeasures
    • 5.4.5 Drugs
  • 5.5 Downwards Cycle of Fatigue
  • 5.6 References for Chapter Five

  
  

• Chapter 6: Technology in the Creation and Mitigation of Risk
  • 6.1 A Brief Overview of Night Vision
    • 6.1.1 Visual Perception and Adaptation
    • 6.1.2 Image Intensification Systems
    • 6.1.3 Infrared and Thermal Imaging Systems
  • 6.2 Statistical Studies of NVD Mishaps
  • 6.3 Technology Mitigating the Risk of Mishaps
  • 6.4 Technology Exacerbating the Risk of Mishaps
  • 6.5 Night-Vision Accidents and Training
  • 6.6 Risk Management of Disruptive Technologies
  • 6.7 References for Chapter Six

  
  

• Chapter 7: Environmental Hazards and Risk Management
  • 7.1 Causes of Brown-Out Accidents
    • 7.1.1 Spatial Disorientation and Crew Resource Management
    • 7.1.2 Operational Demands and Environmental Features
    • 7.1.3 Platform Specific Features
  • 7.2 Brown Out Countermeasures
    • 7.2.1 Training, Tactics and Procedures
    • 7.2.2 Resilience Engineering
    • 7.2.3 Ground-Based Countermeasures
    • 7.2.4 Airborne Countermeasures
  • 7.3 Environmental Hazards and the Loss of An RAF Puma
    • 7.3.1 Mission Planning in Uncertain Environments
    • 7.3.2 Closing on the Target
    • 7.3.3 Approach to Landing
    • 7.3.4 Environmental Hazards
    • 7.3.5 Operational and Command Hazards
  • 7.4 Operational Tempo and Risk Exposure
  • 7.5 References for Chapter Seven

  
  

• Chapter 8: UAVs and the Military Hazards of Political Decision Making
  • 8.1 UAV Deployment in Afghanistan
    • 8.1.1 Political Pressure for Unforecast Operational Requirements
    • 8.1.2 UAVs, Risk Erosion and the Loss of First Person Liability
    • 8.1.3 UAVs, Human Factors and Remote Situation Awareness
    • 8.1.4 Hazards Created by UAS Configuration
    • 8.1.5 Hazards Created by UAS Airworthiness Problems
    • 8.1.6 Wider Political Risks of Unforecast Operational Requirements
  • 8.2 National Security and the Risks to Civilians
    • 8.2.1 Overview of the Nogales Predator Mishap
    • 8.2.2 Political Pressure for the Civil Use of Military Systems
    • 8.2.3 Civil and Military UAV Airworthiness Requirements
    • 8.2.4 Public Use, Regulation and Sub-Contracting
    • 8.2.5 Risk Management in Civil Applications of Military Systems
    • 8.2.6 The Hazards of Autonomous Operation
    • 8.2.7 Communications and Mitigation in Autonomous Operation
  • 8.3 Common Political Hazards in Civil and Military Systems
  • 8.4 References for Chapter Eight

  
  

• Chapter 9: Military Risk Assessment in Counter Insurgency Operations
  • 9.1 The Hazards of Counterinsurgency
    • 9.1.1 Case Study in the Hazards of Counter Insurgency
    • 9.1.2 The Accident Pit in Insurgent Operations
  • 9.2 Immediate Causes of the Incident
    • 9.2.1 Inadequate Briefings on Insurgent Risks
    • 9.2.2 Lack of Night Vision Equipment
    • 9.2.3 Lack of Appropriate Firepower
    • 9.2.4 The Ambiguities of Counterinsurgency Operations
  • 9.3 Longer Term Risks in Counterinsurgency
    • 9.3.1 Insufficient Personnel with Counterinsurgency Expertise
    • 9.3.2 Insufficient Support from Local Forces
    • 9.3.3 Inadequate Equipment
  • 9.4 Strategic & Tactical Risk Assessments for Counterinsurgency
    • 9.4.1 Was the Strategic Risk Assessment Adequate?
    • 9.4.2 Was the Tactical Risk Assessment Adequate?
  • 9.5 From Counterinsurgency to Counterterrorism
  • 9.6 References for Chapter Nine

  
  

• Chapter 10: Military and Civil Risks in Counter-IED Operations
  • 10.1 C-IED Risk Assessments in Military and Civil Contexts
    • 10.1.1 Strategic Similarities
    • 10.1.2 Tactical Similarities
    • 10.1.3 Operational Similarities
  • 10.2 Risk-Based Approaches to C-IED Operations
    • 10.2.1 The IED Development Model
    • 10.2.2 Using Previous Hazards to Simulate Future Attacks
  • 10.3 The Challenge of C-IED Risk Assessment
    • 10.3.1 The Global Nature of the Problem
    • 10.3.2 Accounting for Many Different IED Technologies
    • 10.3.3 Assessing the Risks from Different Explosives
    • 10.3.4 Assessing the Risks of Large Scale Attacks
    • 10.3.5 Assessing the Risks of Medium Scale Attacks
    • 10.3.6 Assessing the Risks to Individuals
    • 10.3.7 Accounting for the Diversity of Delivery Mechanisms
    • 10.3.8 Assessing the Risks of Innovation in IED Technology
    • 10.3.9 Anticipating the Dynamic Refinement of IED Tactics
    • 10.3.10 Assessing the Risks of Multiple Coordinated Attacks
    • 10.3.11 Predicting the Impact of Warnings and Hoaxes
  • 10.4 A Systems Perspective on C-IED Risk Assessment
  • 10.5 References for Chapter Ten

  
  

• Chapter 11: The Future of Military Risk Assessment
  • 11.1 The Boundaries of Military Risk Assessment
  • 11.2 A Roadmap for Military Risk Assessment
  • 11.3 The Future Risks of Cyber Defense
  • 11.4 Risk Assessment and Austerity
  • 11.5 References for Chapter Eleven

  
  

• 12 Acknowledgements