... economics.1
<#14#>Our ideas were first presented in Cockshott and Cottrell (1989), and are set out most fully in Cockshott and Cottrell (1993). Cottrell and Cockshott (1993a) re-examines the historic socialist calculation debate, with emphasis on the arguments of Mises and Lange. In Cottrell and Cockshott (1993b) we stress the differences between our proposals and the system that existed in the Soviet Union. Technical details of the algorithm we propose for short- to medium-term planning are spelled out in Cockshott (1990).<#14#>
.
.
.
.
.
.
.
.
.
.
.
.
.
.
.
.
.
.
.
.
.
.
.
.
.
.
.
.
.
.
... existence;2
<#263#>2 Take the homely example of Christmas shopping. Many of us find it impossible to draw up a complete plan for such shopping in advance. We have to go to the shops, look at the goods and their prices, and see what strikes our fancy. Our `demand functions' are revealed to ourselves in the act of choosing.<#263#>
.
.
.
.
.
.
.
.
.
.
.
.
.
.
.
.
.
.
.
.
.
.
.
.
.
.
.
.
.
.
... transferable.3
<#285#>Admittedly, such an image does not of itself provide any information on how, for instance, a particularly favourable set of input--output relations can be <#273#>achieved<#273#>, only that it is <#274#>possible<#274#>. We offer some further thoughts on the transmission of such `know how' in Section 6 below.<#285#>
.
.
.
.
.
.
.
.
.
.
.
.
.
.
.
.
.
.
.
.
.
.
.
.
.
.
.
.
.
.
... granted.4
<#286#>Although Nove's case is surely exaggerated in one respect: if the central plan calls for enterprise A to supply intermediate good <#276#>x<#276#> to enterprise B, where it will be used in the production of some further good <#277#>y<#277#>, and if the planners apprise A and B of this fact, surely there is scope for horizontal discussion between the two enterprises over the precise design specification of <#278#>x<#278#>, even in the absence of market relations between A and B.<#286#>
.
.
.
.
.
.
.
.
.
.
.
.
.
.
.
.
.
.
.
.
.
.
.
.
.
.
.
.
.
.
... 1955;5
<#287#>4 The specific reference here is to p. 43, and more particularly to note 37 on pp. 212--213, of <#283#>The Counter-Revolution of Science<#283#>. In the note, Hayek appeals to the judgment of Pareto and Cournot, that the solution of a system of equations representing the conditions of general equilibrium would be practically infeasible. This is perhaps worth emphasising in view of the tendency of Hayek's modern supporters to play down the computational issue.<#287#>
.
.
.
.
.
.
.
.
.
.
.
.
.
.
.
.
.
.
.
.
.
.
.
.
.
.
.
.
.
.
....6
<#388#>6 Note that this information measure of the distance from equilibrium, based on a sum of logarithms, differs from a simple Euclidean measure, based on a sum of squares. The information measure is more sensitive to a multiplicity of small errors than to one large error. Because of the equivalence between information and entropy it also measures the conditional entropy of the system.<#388#>
.
.
.
.
.
.
.
.
.
.
.
.
.
.
.
.
.
.
.
.
.
.
.
.
.
.
.
.
.
.