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MATCH-UP 2015
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University of Glasgow, 16-18 April 2015 |
MATCH-UP 2015 Accepted PapersPapers listed in order of submissionMarket Design under Distributional Constraints: Diversity in School Choice and Other Applications . College Admissions with Entrance Exams: Centralized versus Decentralized Full Substitutability in Trading Networks A new solution for the roommate problem: The Q-stable matchings Time Horizons, Lattice Structures, and Welfare in Multi-period Matching Markets Object Allocation via Deferred-Acceptance: Strategy-Proofness and Comparative Statics Matroidal Choice Functions Social Welfare in One-sided Matchings: Random Priority and Beyond Manipulating the Probabilistic Serial Rule Generalized three-sided assignment markets: consistency and the core Fairness and Efficiency in a Random Assignment: Three Impossibility Results The most ordinally-egalitarian of random voting rules Polyhedral aspects of stable b-matching A New Efficiency Criterion for Probabilistic Assignments College Admission with Multidimensional Privileges: The Brazilian Affirmative Action Case The size of the core in assignment markets Factor Revealing LPs and Stable Matching with Ties and Incomplete Lists Possible and Necessary Allocations via Sequential Mechanisms Improved Algorithmic Results for Unsplittable Stable Allocation Problems Contracts versus Salaries in Matching: A General Result Matroid Generalizations of the Popular Matching and Condensation Problems with Strict Preferences Sticky Matching in School Choice It's Not Easy Being Three: The Approximability of Three Dimensional Stable Matching Problems On The Structure of Popular Matchings in The Stable Marriage Problem ---Who Can Join a Popular Matching? Robust models for the Kidney Exchange Problem Driven by priorities manipulations under the Boston mechanism Trading networks with bilateral contracts A Local Search Algorithm for SMTI and its extension to HRT Problems On weighted kernels of two posets Overlapping Multiple Assignments Dynamic Task Assignments: An Online Two Sided Matching Approach Two School Systems, One District: What to do when a unified admissions process is impossible Strategy-Proofness and Stability for Matching with Contracts The Secure Boston Mechanism The Curse of Stability: Designing the Appeals Round in School Choice School Choice with Neighbors The Stable Fixtures Problem with Payments The (Non)-Existence of Stable Mechanisms in Incomplete Information Environments
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