MATCH-UP 2024 is the 7th workshop in an interdisciplinary and international workshops in the series on matching under preferences. It will take place on 9 - 11 September 2024, hosted by the University of Oxford, United Kingdom.
Matching problems with preferences occur in widespread applications such as the assignment of school-leavers to universities, junior doctors to hospitals, students to campus housing, children to schools, kidney transplant patients to donors and so on. The common thread is that individuals have preference lists over the possible outcomes and the task is to find a matching of the participants that is in some sense optimal with respect to these preferences.
The remit of this workshop is to explore matching problems with preferences from the perspective of algorithms and complexity, discrete mathematics, combinatorial optimization, game theory, mechanism design and economics, and thus a key objective is to bring together the research communities of the related areas.
List of Topics
The matching problems under consideration include, but are not limited to:
- Two-sided matchings involving agents on both sides (e.g., college admissions, medical resident allocation, job markets, and school choice)
- Two-sided matchings involving agents and objects (e.g., house allocation, course allocation, project allocation, assigning papers to reviewers, and school choice)
- One-sided matchings (e.g., roommate problems, coalition formation games, and kidney exchange)
- Multi-dimensional matchings (e.g., 3D stable matching problems)
- Matching with payments (e.g., assignment game)
- Online and stochastic matching models (e.g., Google Ads, ride sharing, Match.com)
- Other recent applications (e.g., refugee resettlement, food banks, social housing, and daycare)
This workshop was generously sponsored by
NOTE: The 17th International Symposium on Algorithmic Game Theory (SAGT) will take place just before MATCH-UP at Centrum Wiskunde & Informatica (CWI) in Amsterdam, The Netherlands, September 3–6, 2024.
We call for two types of contributions. Authors should indicate in the Keywords which format type their paper should be considered under.
Format A
- Original contribution, not previously published in (or accepted by) another conference proceedings or journal
- Not under review for a conference or journal elsewhere
Format B
- Not necessarily original work
- Could have been published already in (or accepted by) another conference proceedings or journal
- Can be under review for a conference or journal elsewhere
The Programme Committee may give priority to Format A papers in the final selection.
Submit your paper
Submissions should be at most 18 pages long (excluding bibliography), formatted for A4 paper, using 11 point font or larger with at least 1" margins all round, and in single-column format. Submissions in EC or SAGT formats are very welcome. Any material beyond this limit should be placed in a clearly marked appendix which will be read at the discretion of the programme committee. There is no specified style file for submissions (e.g., LNCS or ACM style files are fine).
Please indicate in the Keywords whether your paper is Format A or Format B.
Proceedings
Only abstracts of accepted papers will appear in the workshop proceedings. This should allow the simultaneous or subsequent submission of contributed papers to other workshops, conferences or journals. If authors so choose, they may include a link to the full version of their paper (if published, e.g., on arXiv, REpeC, SSRN or on a personal web page) in the proceedings.
Paper submission portal: https://easychair.org/conferences/?conf=matchup2024 .
Special Issue
Mathematics of Operations Research is running a Special Issue on Mathematics of Market Design. The editors of the special issue warmly welcome papers submitted to MATCH-UP to the Special Issue. There is no forward-to-journal option, however, MOR editors might request MATCH-UP reviews during their decision if the authors indicate that they had submitted to MATCH-UP. Authors will be contacted separately to grant permission to MATCH-UP to share reviews. Deadline for submission to MOR is Sept 30, 2024.Important dates
- Paper submission deadline:
01 May 2024(extended to 08 May 2024 23:59 AoE) - Notification: 01 July 2024
- Early registration deadline: 22 July 2024
- Final registration deadline: 18 August 2024
- Workshop: 09 – 11 September 2024
Program
TBC
Logistics
The workshop will be held at St. Catherine's College, University of Oxford . There will be accommodation on site which will be offered with the registration. Oxford is easy to reach (~1h) by train from London Paddington or London Marylebone and by coach from London Heathrow airport. There are also buses from London Gatwick and London Stansted airports.
Registration
If your paper or poster has been accepted, at least one of the presenters must register by the early bird registration deadline.
Please fill out the registration form. We will then:
- send you a payment link;
- contact you for further information if you need a visa letter or other travel support;
- contact you if you have access requirements.
| Registration | Deadline | Student Fee | Regular Fee |
|---|---|---|---|
| Early Bird | 22 July | £350 | £390 |
| Final | 18 August | £400 | £440 |
- 4 nights of single-room accommodation at St Catherine’s College from Sunday 8th September until Thursday 12th September including breakfast and lunches;
- Gala dinner on Tuesday 10th September at Queen’s College;
- Dinners on Monday 9th September and Wednesday 11th September at St Catherine’s College;
- Walking tour of Oxford on Tuesday 10th September;
- Welcome drink on Sunday 8th September;
- Tote bag with MATCH-UP 2024 merchandise.
Accepted Papers
- Gergely Csáji, Tamás Király, Kenjiro Takazawa and Yu Yokoi: Popular Maximum-Utility Matchings with Matroid Constraints
- Tamás Fleiner, Tamás Király and András Frank: Two-phase greedy algorithms for stable matchings
- Telikepalli Kavitha and Kazuhisa Makino: Min-Cost Popular Matchings in a Hospitals/Residents Instance with Complete Preferences
- Frederik Glitzner and David Manlove: Structural and algorithmic results for stable cycles and partitions in the Roommates problem
- Ermis Soumalias, Behnoosh Zamanlooy, Jakob Weissteiner and Sven Seuken: Machine Learning-Powered Course Allocation
- Scott Paiement, Umut Dur and Yi-Cheng Kao: Market Design of College-Major Switches for Reducing Student-Major Mismatch
- Umut Dur and Yanning Zhang: Chinese High School Admissions under Affirmative Action Policies with Score Constraints
- Lingbo Huang and Jun Zhang: Bundled School Choice
- Thành Nguyen, Alexander Teytelboym and Shai Vardi: Efficient Combinatorial Assignment
- Jacob Coreno and Di Feng: Some Characterizations of TTC in Multiple-Object Reallocation Problems
- Christian Basteck: An Axiomatization of the Random Priority Rule
- Shunya Noda and Genta Okada: Money Burning with Multiple Objects: Theory, Computation, and Application to Vaccine Allocation
- Nick Arnosti: Probabilistic Predictions for Two-Sided Matching Markets
- Xihao Song: Order of Objects and Easy to Implement algorithm: fairness and efficiency
- Itai Ashlagi, Süleyman Kerimov and Omer Tamuz: The Power of Two in Token Systems
- Julius Goedde: Pricing in markets without money: Theory and evidence from home exchanges
- Simon Finster, Patrick Loiseau, Simon Mauras, Mathieu Molina and Bary Pradelski: Equitable Pricing in Auctions
- Remi Castera, Patrick Loiseau and Bary Pradelski: Correlation of rankings in matching markets
- Dušan Knop and Šimon Schierreich: Host Community Respecting Refugee Housing
- José Antonio Rodríguez Bacallado: Seat Arrangement Problems under B-utility and W-utility
- Haris Aziz, Peter Biro, Gergely Csáji and Ali Pourmiri: Ex-post Stability under Two-Sided Matching: Complexity and Characterization
- Süleyman Kerimov, Itai Ashlagi and Itai Gurvich: On the Optimality of Greedy Policies in Dynamic Matching
- Omar El Housni, Alfredo Torrico and Ulysse Hennebelle: Two-sided Assortment Optimization: Adaptivity Gaps and Approximation Algorithms
- Frederik Glitzner and David Manlove: MATWA: A web toolkit for matching under preferences
Accepted Posters
- Shivika Narang, Sanjukta Roy and Hadi Hosseini: Strategyproof Matching of Roommates and Rooms
- Cyril Rouault: Contract Terms Monotonicity in Matching Markets
- Yohai Trabelsi, Abhijin Adiga, Yonatan Aumann, Sarit Kraus and S. S. Ravi: Facilitating Matches on Allocation Platforms
- Jesse Silbert and Wilbur Townsend: Job Matching without Price Discrimination
- Márton Benedek, Peter Biro, Gergely Csáji, Matthew Johnson, Daniel Paulusma and Xin Ye: Computing Balanced Solutions for Large International Kidney Exchange Schemes When Cycle Length Is Unbounded
- Maria Cherifa, Clément Calauzènes and Vianney Perchet: Dynamic online matching with budget refills
- Gergely Csáji: Weakly-Popular and Super-Popular Matchings with Ties and Their Connection to Stable Matchings
- Candida Bowtell and Richard Mycroft: Matchings in multipartite hypergraphs
- Mehdi Feizi: Democratic Efficient Assignment of (In)divisible Goods
- Edwin Lock, Zephyr Qiu and Alexander Teytelboym: The Computational Complexity of the Housing Market
Invited Speakers
Tommy Andersson (Lund University)
Kavitha Telikepalli (Tata Institute of Fundamental Research)
Organising Committee
- Ildi Schlotter, (Programme Committee Co-Chair)
- Alexander Westkamp, (Programme Committee Co-Chair)
- Sofiat Olaosebikan, University of Glasgow, UK (Organizing Committee Co-Chair)
- Alex Teytelboym, University of Oxford, UK (Organizing Committee Co-Chair and Local Organizer)
Steering Committee
- Péter Biró, Hungarian Academy of Sciences, Hungary
- Brian Dean, Clemson University, USA
- Bettina Klaus, University of Lausanne, Switzerland
- David Manlove, University of Glasgow, UK
Program Committee
- Kristóf Bérczi
- Günnur Ege Bilgin
- Péter Biró
- Inacio Bo
- Niclas Boehmer
- Martin Bullinger
- Katarína Cechlárová
- Christine Cheng
- Jiehua Chen
- Julien Combe
- David Delacretaz
- Batal Dogan
- Umut Dur
- Albin Erlanson
- Tamas Fleiner
- Aram Grigoryan
- Jens Gudmundsson
- Guillaume Haeringer
- Isa Hafalir
- Eun Jeong Heo
- Chien-Chung Huang
- Naoyuki Kamiyama
- Tamas Király
- Flip Klijn
- Dusan Knop
- Scott Kominers
- Jiunjie Luo
- David Manlove
- Jannik Matuschke
- Andrew McKenzie
- Antonio Miralles
- Shuichi Miyazaki
- Markus Möller
- Thayer Morrill
- Alexandru Nichifor
- Josue Ortega
- Katarzyna Paluch
- Daniel Paulusma
- William Phan
- Marek Pycia
- Rasoul Ramenazian
- Baharak Rastegari
- Antonio Romero-Medina
- Ricardo Saulle
- Ildikó Schlotter (CS PC Chair)
- Jay Sethuraman
- Ran Shorrer
- Alex Teytelboym
- Alexander Westkamp (Econ PC Chair)
- M. Bumin Yenmez
- Yu Yokoi
- Yu Zhou
Sponsors
MATCH-UP 2008: 6 July 2008 at Reykjavík University, Iceland (41 participants). It was held as a satellite workshop of ICALP 2008.
MATCH-UP 2012: 19-20 July 2012 at Corvinus University of Budapest, Hungary (68 participants).
MATCH-UP 2015: 14-16 April 2015 at the University of Glasgow, Scotland (80 participants).
MATCH-UP 2017: 20-21 April 2017 at Microsoft Research New England, Cambridge, USA (108 participants).
MATCH-UP 2019: 26-29 May 2019 at Congressi Stefano Franscini, Monte Verità Ascona, Switzerland (46 participants).
MATCH-UP 2022: 24 - 26 August 2022 at TU Vienna, Austria (59 participants, including 5 online)
More information about the workshop series can be found in MATCH-UP